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Developing countries frequently face large adverse shocks to their economies. We 
study two distinct types of such shocks: large declines in the price of a country’s 
commodity exports and severe natural disasters. Unsurprisingly, adverse shocks 
reduce the short-term growth of constant-price GDP and we analyse which structural 
policies help to minimize these losses. Structural policies are incentives and 
regulations that are maintained for long periods, contrasting with policy responses to 
shocks, the analysis of which has dominated the literature. We show that some 
previously neglected structural policies have large effects that are specific to 
particular types of shock. In particular, regulations which reduce the speed of firm 
exit substantially increase the short-term growth loss from adverse non-agricultural 
export price shocks and so are particularly ill-suited to mineral exporting economies. 
Natural disasters appear to be better accommodated by labour market policies, 
perhaps because such shocks directly dislocate the population.  
 
JEL classifications: O47, Q38, Q54. 
1. Introduction 
 
Global commodity prices are highly volatile and this makes commodity exporters 
shock-prone. The analysis of economic policies appropriate for such economies has 
focused predominantly upon government responses to windfalls: notably, how should 
it adjust public spending and the exchange rate? In contrast, our focus is upon  
structural policies, typically maintained for long periods, that affect the ability of 
private actors to respond to shocks through regulation. Rather than windfalls we 
consider adverse shocks. With the current sharp and unanticipated decline in 
commodity prices it is appropriate to consider the adoption of structural policies that 
might better enable the economies of commodity-exporting countries to cope.    
 
In principle, it should be far easier for a government to get structural policies right 
than to get policy responses right. Response requires that a government be fleet of 
foot, and may also require it to make a correct assessment as to how the shock will 
evolve. In contrast, appropriate structural policies do not need to be adopted in haste: 
a government that recognizes that its economy is prone to shocks can gradually put in 
place such policies as precautionary and subsequent governments can maintain this 
legacy without further action.  
 
In this paper we empirically investigate the role of structural policies in mitigating the 
growth loss from adverse shocks. In addition to commodity export price shocks, we 
also consider large natural disasters. Using data for around 130 countries from 1964 
till 2003, we find that adverse commodity export price shocks and natural disasters 
matter substantially for short-term growth. We do not find evidence of a long run 
  
effect of commodity export price shocks (volatility) on the level of GDP. We 
investigate the efficacy of a range of structural policies in mitigating the negative 
short-term growth effects from shocks. Our results show that regulations that delay 
the speed of firm closure significantly and substantially increase the short-term 
growth loss from adverse price shocks in commodity-exporting countries. In the case 
of natural disasters, on the other hand, the negative effect on short-term growth is 
increased by labour market regulations that prevent an efficient re-allocation of 
workers. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and shock measures, as 
well as the inclusion of an extensive range of control variables for other regulations, 
other policies, and institutional quality.1  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss our methodology and our 
data. Section 3 presents our core results and section 4 tests their robustness. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
Our estimation strategy involves two steps. We first test the effects of adverse shocks 
on growth. Having established their adverse effects, we then investigate the 
consequences of various structural policies in mitigating the losses. 
 
2.1 Measuring shocks 
 
                                                 
1
 This paper is related to the literature on terms-of-trade shocks and growth. Recent contributions 
include Broda (2004), Loayza and Raddatz (2007), and Raddatz (2007).  
  
The first step is to construct a measure of adverse shocks. We consider two distinct 
types of shock: large declines in the price of a country’s commodity exports, and 
severe natural disasters.   
 
We use the commodity export price index of Collier and Goderis (2008) to construct 
measures of commodity export price shocks.2 The index was constructed using the 
methodology of Deaton and Miller (1995) and Dehn (2000). We collected data on 
world commodity prices and commodity export values for as many commodities as 
data availability allowed. Table 1b lists the 50 commodities in our sample. For each 
country we calculate the total 1990 value of commodity exports. We construct 
weights by dividing the individual 1990 export values for each commodity by this 
total. These 1990 weights are then held fixed over time and applied to the world price 
indices of the same commodities to form a country-specific geometrically weighted 
index of commodity export prices. This index was first constructed on a quarterly 
basis and deflated by the export unit value. We then calculate the annual average of 
the quarterly index (rescaled so that 1980 = 100), which yields an annual commodity 
export price index. Below, we will use this annual index to construct measures of 
commodity export price shocks and commodity export price volatility.  
 
We first construct measures of commodity export price shocks. We define shocks as 
episodes with large changes in commodity export prices. In our core results we follow 
Collier and Dehn (2001) in removing the predictable component of shocks. 
Specifically, we take the first difference of the log of the annual commodity export 
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 See Collier and Goderis (2008) for data description and sources. 
  
price index and then remove its predictable component by running the following 
forecasting estimation model: 
 
)1(                                                                          
,2,21,110, titititi IItI εββαα +∆+∆++=∆ −−
   
where tiI ,  is the log annual commodity export price index and t is a linear time trend. 
We collect the residuals  
,tiε from eq. (1) and calculate the 10th and 90th percentile of 
their distribution. However, our results are not dependent upon the exclusion of the 
predictable component. Indeed, the extreme shocks on which we focus are virtually 
unpredictable from past price information so that any such adjustment makes only a 
negligible difference. Positive and negative commodity export price shock episodes 
are defined as the observations with residuals above the 90th or below the 10th 
percentile, respectively. For robustness we will also estimate the effect of shocks 
using the 5th and 95th percentile as thresholds. Having identified the shock episodes, 
we next construct two variables. The first captures positive commodity export price 
shocks and equals the first log difference of the annual commodity export price index 
for the positive shock episodes, and zero otherwise. The second captures negative 
commodity export price shocks and equals minus the first log difference of the annual 
commodity export price index for the negative shock episodes, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, to allow the effect of commodity export price shocks to be larger for countries 
with larger exports, we weight the two variables by the share of commodity exports in 
GDP. Our estimation sample contains 372 positive shock episodes and 392 negative 
shock episodes. We will use the constructed measures to test the effect of commodity 
export price shocks on short run growth.  
 
  
In addition to any effect of shocks on short run growth, changes in commodity export 
prices may also have an effect on growth in the long run. To allow for this possibility, 
we also include a measure of export price volatility. In particular, we construct a 
variable that captures the pre-1986 mean absolute change in the log of the annual 
commodity export price index for the years before 1986 and the post-1985 mean 
absolute change in the log of the annual commodity export price index for the years 
after 1985. We then weight this variable by the share of commodity exports in GDP to 
allow the effect of volatility to be proportional to a country’s exposure and use the 
weighted measure of volatility to estimate the effect of commodity export price 
volatility on the long run level of GDP. For sensitivity, we constructed an alternative 
measure of volatility. In particular, we use the quarterly deflated commodity export 
price index,3 and for each quarter calculate the country-specific standard deviation of 
this index over the quarter and the three preceding quarters. This yields a country-
specific rolling standard deviation of commodity export prices. We then use the log of 
the annual average of this variable, weighted by the share of commodity exports in 
GDP, as an alternative measure of volatility.  
 
As a final commodity export price measure, we use the log of the annual commodity 
export price index, weighted by the 1990 share of commodity exports in GDP, as a 
long run control variable. We also include an oil import price index, which was 
constructed by interacting the log of the annual average of a deflated quarterly world 
oil price index with a dummy variable for net oil importers.4    
                                                 
3
 This is the quarterly index that we constructed prior to calculating its annual average to obtain the 
annual commodity export price index. 
4
 See Collier and Goderis (2008) for data description and sources. 
  
 
Our indicator of natural disasters captures the total number of geological, climatic, 
and human disasters in a year (Raddatz, 2007).5 We include only events that qualify 
as ‘large’ disasters according to the criteria established by the International Monetary 
Fund (2003).6 Our estimation sample contains 683 episodes with one or more large 
natural disasters. 
 
2.2 Effects of shocks on growth 
 
We analyse the effects of shocks by estimating the error-correction model in eq. (2) 
below.7  
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where the subscripts i = 1,…N and t = 1,…T  index the countries and years in the 
panel, respectively. tiy ,  is log real GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ (World 
Development Indicators, henceforth WDI) in country i in year t, iα is a country-
specific fixed effect, and tiz ,  is an rT × 1 vector of regional year dummies, where r is 
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 Data are from the WHO Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED). Geological disasters: earthquakes, landslides, volcano eruptions, tidal waves; Climatic 
disasters: floods, droughts, extreme temperatures, wind storms; Human disasters: famines, epidemics. 
6
 ≥ 0.5% of population affected or damage ≥ 0.5% of GDP or ≥ 1 death per 10000.  
7
 This model is based on Collier and Goderis (2008), who report panel unit root and cointegration tests. 
  
the number of regions.8 1, −tix  is an m × 1 vector of m variables that are expected to 
affect GDP in the long run and in the short run. We include three control variables 
from the empirical growth literature: trade openness, measured as the ratio of trade to 
GDP (WDI); inflation, measured as the log of 1 plus the annual consumer price 
inflation rate (WDI); and international reserves over GDP (International Financial 
Statistics, henceforth IFS, and WDI). 1-,til  is an h × 1 vector of h variables that are 
expected to affect GDP in the long run only. We include the log of the annual 
commodity export price index, weighted by the 1990 share of commodity exports in 
GDP, as well as the oil import price index, to control for the long run effects of 
commodity export and oil import prices.9 We also include our indicator of commodity 
export price volatility. The vector jtis −,  consists of n variables that are expected to 
have only a short-run effect on growth and includes our measures of commodity 
export price shocks and natural disasters.10 We also include indicators that capture 
civil war (Gleditsch, 2004) and the number of coup d’états.11  
 
Our key interest is in the vector jtip −,  of k indicators of policies that could 
potentially mitigate the adverse growth effects of commodity export price shocks and 
                                                 
8
 We include the following regions: Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific 
and Oceania, Latin America and Caribbean, North Africa and Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Western Europe and North-America.   
9
 The short run effect of commodity export prices is captured by the shock variables (see below). 
10
 The price shocks capture large changes in the commodity export price index. We did not find any 
significant effect of smaller price changes and therefore did not include the change in the index.   
11
 A coup d’état is defined as an extra constitutional or forced change in the government elite or its 
control of the nation’s power structure (Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive). 
  
natural disasters. Some of these structural policies are standard in the analysis of 
shocks, notably financial depth, financial openness, remittances, and international 
reserves. The key contribution of this paper is to add indicators that capture the 
flexibility of labour markets and the flexibility of firm entry and exit, all based on the 
‘Doing Business’ surveys of the World Bank. The interaction of jtis −,  and jtip −,  in 
eq. (2) tests whether these structural policies mitigate the effects of shocks.12 
 
Our dataset consists of all countries and years for which data are available, and covers 
around 130 countries between 1964 and 2003. Table 1a reports summary statistics for 
the variables used in estimation.  
 
3. Estimation results 
 
3.1 Preliminaries 
 
The results of estimating eq. (2) are reported in Table 2. We first simply investigate 
whether shocks matter for growth, the interaction effects being introduced later. 
 
The coefficients for commodity export price shocks and natural disasters all have the 
expected signs. Negative price shocks lower growth,13 both in the same year and in 
the next, but the effect is much larger and is significant at 1% in the year after the 
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 We only include shock-policy interactions for commodity export price shocks and natural disasters, 
not for wars and coups. 
13
 Since our dependent variable is the change in log constant-price GDP per capita, it is not directly 
affected by changes in export prices. 
  
shock.14 The size of the coefficient suggests that for countries like Nigeria and 
Zambia, where commodity exports represent 35% of GDP, a negative price shock of 
30% lowers growth in the next year by 0.340*0.35*0.30 = 3.6% points. Positive price 
shocks have a positive effect on growth, but the effects are smaller and the effect in 
the year after the shock is only significant at 10%. This asymmetry is not surprising. If 
the economy is normally close to its productive capacity then sudden large increases 
in export earnings cannot rapidly raise aggregate output. In contrast, sudden large 
decreases will reduce both export output and demand elsewhere in the economy, and 
these will rapidly lower aggregate output unless prices are highly flexible and 
resources swift to move. The coefficient for natural disasters is negative and 
significant at 5%. However, the effect on output of the typical natural disaster is 
modest, lowering growth by only 0.36% points.15  
 
While negative commodity export price shocks significantly lower growth in the short 
run, we do not find evidence of a long-run negative effect of commodity export price 
volatility on GDP. The indicator of volatility enters with the counterintuitive positive 
sign and the coefficient is far from significant.16  
 
We next turn to the other variables in Table 2. The long-run coefficients for trade 
openness, inflation, and international reserves have the expected signs and are 
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 We experimented with additional lags and squared terms but they proved to be unimportant. 
15
 In all tables, we multiply the coefficients for natural disasters by 10 to make them more informative 
(compare -0.036 with -0.004). The coefficient in Table 2 (-0.036) thus corresponds to a growth loss of 
0.10 * 0.036 = 0.36% points. 
16
 We tested the robustness of this result using our alternative measure of volatility. The long run 
coefficient was again positive and insignificant.   
  
significant. The long-run effect of commodity export prices is negative and 
significant, which is consistent with the ‘resource curse’ finding in Collier and 
Goderis (2008). The long run effect of higher oil prices on oil importing countries is 
negative but insignificant. The short-run adjustment coefficient is highly significant 
and suggests a speed of adjustment of around 6% per year. The other short-run 
coefficients all have the expected signs but are sometimes insignificant. The lagged 
dependent variable enters positive and significant at 1%, while coups and civil wars 
have unsurprisingly large adverse effects on growth.  
 
3.2 Shocks and policies 
 
Having established that both negative commodity export price shocks and natural 
disasters have significant adverse growth effects, we now investigate alternative 
policies that could mitigate these effects. We first considered financial depth, financial 
openness, international reserves, and remittances but did not find any significant 
shock-mitigating effect of these policies.17   
 
Governments control an array of policies that affect the functioning of labour markets. 
Because employment is politically sensitive, there is a wide range in the degree to 
which governments regulate labour markets, permitting flexibility. We might expect 
that the ability of economic actors to respond to shocks is influenced by regulatory 
restrictions on hiring and firing. In countries with more flexible labour markets, 
labour can more easily be reallocated from sectors or regions that are hit by the shock.  
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 To save space, we do not discuss these estimation results but they are available in the working paper 
version (Collier and Goderis, 2009). 
  
 
We investigate the importance of labour market flexibility using indices of 
employment flexibility that were calculated from data of the ‘Doing Business’ surveys 
of the World Bank (World Bank, 2007). The Doing Business project started in 2004 
and provides measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 178 
countries. Part of the project focuses on the regulation of employment and includes a 
composite index of ‘rigidity of employment’, which is the average of 3 sub-indices: a 
difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index, and a difficulty of firing index. All 
indices have ordinal scales. Our composite measure of employment flexibility is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one for all years if a country’s average value of 
the ‘rigidity of employment’ index between 2004 and 2007 is below its median value 
for all countries and zero if it is above its median value. 
 
In addition to the regulation of employment, Doing Business also studies the 
regulation of firm exit and entry. This involves all procedures that entrepreneurs have 
to follow in order to close down or start up a business. Since the ability of an 
economy to reallocate capital and labour after a shock is likely to depend on the 
flexibility of entrepreneurs to close down businesses, we specifically investigate 
whether the flexibility of firm exit mitigates the adverse effects of shocks.  
 
Our measure of speed of firm exit is based on the average 2004-2007 value of the 
variable ‘time to close a business’ in Doing Business, which we rescaled to range 
  
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a higher speed of firm exit.18 The time to 
close a business is calculated for a limited liability company in the country’s most 
populous city, which has a hotel as its major asset and employs 201 employees. It 
varies between 5 months and 10 years.  
 
We first test whether employment flexibility and speed of firm exit mitigate the 
negative growth effects of adverse commodity export price shocks.19 In Table 3, we 
add interactions of the indicators of each of these flexibility measures with each of the 
four commodity export price shocks to the specification of Table 2.20 The lagged 
negative price shock again enters negative and the coefficient is significant at 1%, 
indicating that a country without shock cushioning policies suffers a significant 
growth loss. However, the interaction of the shock with our speed of firm exit 
indicator enters positive and is significant at 5%, suggesting that countries with faster 
bankruptcy procedures suffer significantly less from export price shocks. The effect is 
big. For a country like Indonesia, with commodity exports of 15% of GDP, a 
relatively low speed of firm exit of 0.45 (5th percentile of the sample distribution), and 
a value of zero for the employment flexibility dummy, a negative price shock of 30% 
lowers growth in the next year by around 2.61% points. If Indonesia were to increase 
its speed of firm exit to the 95th percentile of the sample distribution (0.95), this 
growth loss would fall from 2.61% points to 0.49% points. These results suggest that 
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 In contrast to the ordinal indicators of labour market flexibility, the indicator ‘time to close a 
business’ has a cardinal scale. We therefore did not turn it into a dummy but constructed a continuous 
indicator of the speed of firm exit. 
19
 The correlation between our indicators of employment flexibility and speed of firm exit is 0.11. 
20
 We do not add the flexibility measures by themselves as they are time invariant and are therefore 
captured by the fixed effects.   
  
the speed of bankruptcy procedures is very important for the ability of countries to 
cope with adverse commodity export price shocks. 
 
Although the procedures for closing a business will often extend beyond the growth 
impact of a shock, we might indeed expect the speed with which they can be 
completed to be important. One reason is that adverse shocks can lead to a severe 
reduction in lending. Such liquidity problems are much more likely to occur in 
countries with lengthy and disorderly bankruptcy procedures. If investors face years 
of litigation and uncertainty, they will be much less inclined to provide new loans and 
in the worst case a country’s liquidity will fully dry up. A second potential 
transmission mechanism is that if the supply of entrepreneurship is limited, the 
inability of entrepreneurs to exit activities where business has deteriorated will slow 
the pace at which new opportunities are taken up.    
 
The coefficient of the interaction of the lagged negative price shock with the 
employment flexibility indicator is highly insignificant, indicating that, in contrast to 
the flexibility of firm exit, labour market flexibility does not reduce the growth loss 
from adverse price shocks.21 The coefficients of the other variables in Table 3 are 
similar to the coefficients in Table 2. Perhaps, as with financial depth, labour market 
flexibility might have offsetting effects, facilitating resource reallocation but 
amplifying the initial demand shock as workers lose their jobs.  
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 As part of our sensitivity analysis in section 4, we test the robustness of this finding using an 
alternative labour market flexibility indicator from the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report. We find the same result. 
  
Having established that the speed of firm exit mitigates the adverse effect of 
commodity price shocks, we next investigate whether it also mitigates the adverse 
effect of natural disasters. In Table 4, we add interactions of the indicators of 
employment flexibility and speed of firm exit with the natural disaster variable to the 
specification of Table 2. The natural disaster variable enters with a negative sign and 
is significant at 5%, indicating that a country without shock cushioning policies 
suffers a significant growth loss. The coefficient of the interaction between the natural 
disaster variable and the speed of firm exit indicator is again positive but is 
insignificant. Recall that natural disasters typically have far smaller adverse effects on 
output than do large export price shocks, so that the lack of significance may simply 
be because the interaction effect is too small to detect. This explanation is, however, 
qualified by the interaction between the natural disaster variable and the flexibility of 
employment indicator which enters positive and significant at 1%. Labour market 
flexibility cushions the effects of natural disasters and the effect is substantial. While 
the average natural disaster lowers growth by 1.29% points in countries with no 
mitigating policies, this growth loss is only 0.15% points in countries with a flexible 
labour market. There may therefore be a genuine difference between the effects of the 
policies on export shocks and natural disasters. Disasters are physical shocks that 
typically hit in rural areas, forcing the mass relocation of people. They may therefore 
place a relatively large burden on the labour market, with flexibility enabling people 
who have been relocated to find new employment. In contrast, since businesses are 
overwhelmingly urban, they may only be lightly affected by natural disasters, whereas 
export shocks are exclusively monetary and so inevitably hit them.    
 
4. Sensitivity and endogeneity 
  
 
We now investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications. We first 
consider our finding that speed of firm exit mitigates adverse export price shocks.  
 
4.1 Adverse commodity export price shocks 
 
As a first check, we re-estimate the specification of Table 3 without the interactions of 
the price shocks with employment flexibility. The results are reported in Table 5, 
column (1). To save space, we only report the coefficients and standard errors of the 
variables of interest.22 The lagged adverse price shock again enters with a negative 
sign and remains significant at 5%. The interaction of the shock with speed of firm 
exit again enters positive and is significant at 5%.  
 
A possible concern with these estimation results is that the explanatory variables are 
endogenous. Endogeneity could relate to the shocks, the policies, or both. Adverse 
commodity export price shocks may be endogenous to the extent that some exporters 
may have an influence over the world price of the commodities that they export. To 
address this concern, we express each country’s exports of a given commodity as a 
share of the total world exports of that commodity and repeat this for all other 
commodities in our sample. This yields a list of export shares that reflect the 
importance of individual exporters in the global markets for individual commodities. 
We found that of the 129 countries in our sample, 22 countries export at least one 
commodity for which their share in world exports exceeds 20%. We investigate 
whether the inclusion of these major exporters affected our results by re-estimating 
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 Full results are available in the working paper version (Collier and Goderis, 2009).  
  
the specification in Table 5, column (1), without these 22 countries. Our findings are 
strongly robust. In fact, the coefficients for the shock and the interaction of the shock 
with the speed of firm exit, gain in terms of size and significance. This shows that our 
results are not affected by the large exporters in our sample and hence supports the 
assumption of exogeneity. More generally, it is difficult to see how a large decline in 
export prices could be induced by a decline in aggregate output in exporting countries. 
 
Another possible source of endogeneity is the policy variables. If a country’s speed of 
firm exit is correlated with other (omitted) structural characteristics or policies that 
mitigate shocks, then we might wrongfully attribute the mitigating effects to the speed 
of firm exit. To address this problem, we performed a range of robustness checks. 
First, we re-estimated the specification of Table 5, column (1), but including 
interactions of the price shock variables with each of the other thirty-five Doing 
Business indicators separately.23 The results for all the thirty-five regressions together 
suggest that it is really the speed of firm exit that is important in mitigating the growth 
loss from adverse commodity price shocks and not any other Doing Business 
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 Doing Business captures regulation in ten areas. In addition to ‘Employing Workers’ and ‘Closing a 
Business’, the indicators of which we already use, these areas are ‘Starting a Business’, ‘Dealing with 
Construction Permits’, ‘Registering Property’, ‘Getting Credit’, ‘Protecting Investors’, ‘Paying Taxes’, 
‘Trading Across Borders’, and ‘Enforcing Contracts’. For each indicator, we calculate the average 
2004-2007 value and then rescale this average so that it ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values 
corresponding to more flexibility. We express indicators with an ordinal scale as dummies that for all 
years take a value of one (zero) if the country-specific average level of flexibility over all available 
years is above (below) the median of all countries.  
  
indicator.24 Table 5, column (2), shows the results for the specification in which we 
add an interaction of the shock variable with a speed of firm entry indicator, based on 
the time to start a business. 
 
In addition to the characteristics captured by the Doing Business indicators, our 
results may also be explained by other institutional characteristics or policies that may 
mitigate shocks. To investigate this possibility, we collected twelve indicators of 
governance quality and again re-estimated the specification of Table 5, column (1), 
but this time including interactions of the shock variables with each of the governance 
indicators separately.25 
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 The lagged adverse price shock always enters with a negative sign and the significance level of the 
coefficient is relatively robust: 1% in 21 specifications, 5% in 11 specifications, 10% in 2 
specifications, and insignificant in 1 specification. The coefficient of the interaction between the shock 
and the speed of firm exit is always positive and the significance level of the coefficient is also 
relatively robust: 1% in 9 specifications, 5% in 25 specifications, and insignificant in 1 specification. 
The coefficients of the interactions between the shock and the other Doing Business indicators are 
insignificant in 25 specifications, significant at 10% in 5 specifications, significant at 5% in 4 
specifications, and significant (but with the ‘wrong’ sign) at 1% in 1 specification. In the specification 
where the interaction with speed of firm exit is (just) insignificant, the coefficient is still negative and 
only slightly smaller in size. Moreover, the interaction with the other Doing Business indicator is small 
positive and far from significant.    
25
 The twelve governance indicators are: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (all from Kaufmann et al., 
2008), and civil liberties (Freedom House), political rights (Freedom House), political constraints 
(polconv, Henisz, 2002), democracy (Polity IV), autocracy (PolityIV), and checks and balances 
(Database of Political Institutions). All indicators are introduced as dummies that for all sample years 
take a value of one if the country-specific average level of institutional quality over all available years 
is above the median of all countries and zero otherwise. 
  
 
We do not find a mitigating effect of institutions on the impact of shocks on growth. 
Also, controlling for any effect that institutions may have does not change our finding 
that countries with more flexible firm exit procedures suffer less from adverse price 
shocks.26  
 
As a final robustness check to address potential omitted variable bias, we consider 
two policies that have already been shown to effectively mitigate the growth effect of 
adverse price shocks: exchange rate flexibility (Broda, 2004) and aid (Collier and 
Goderis, forthcoming 2009). We next add our indicators of exchange rate flexibility 
and aid to the specification of Table 5, column (1),27 both individually and interacted 
with each of the four price shocks.28 The results are reported in Table 5, column (3). 
Although the interactions of the lagged price shock with exchange rate flexibility and 
aid enter with the expected sign, neither coefficient is significant. The coefficients of 
the lagged price shock and the interaction of the shock with speed of firm exit, on the 
other hand, gain in terms of size and significance.  
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 In all twelve specifications, the coefficient of the lagged adverse price shock is negative and 
significant at 1%. The coefficient of the interaction between the shock and the speed of firm exit is 
always positive and is significant at 1% in four specifications and at 5% in eight specifications. Finally, 
the coefficients of the interactions between the shock and the institutional indicators are insignificant in 
eight specifications and significant at 10% in four specifications.    
27
 For exchange rate flexibility, we use a dummy based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), which takes a 
value of zero for course classification code = 1, and one for all other categories. For aid, we use official 
development assistance (% of GNI) from OECD IDS.  
28
 Since aid is endogenous, we use IV estimation (see Collier and Goderis, forthcoming 2009).  
  
The results above show that it is the specific indicator of the speed of firm exit which 
is important, as opposed to the many other aspects of the business environment, 
policies, and institutional quality.  
 
Having addressed endogeneity, we next investigate whether our results are robust to 
alternative shock measures. Recall that our commodity export price shock episodes 
were defined as the observations with residuals above the 90th or below the 10th 
percentile in the specification of eq. (1). For sensitivity, we change these thresholds to 
the 95th and the 5th percentile, which reduces the number of shock episodes. Using this 
alternative measure of shocks, we re-estimate the specification in Table 5, column (1). 
The results, reported in Table 5, column (4), show that the estimated coefficients are 
strongly robust and even gain in size and significance.  
 
As a second robustness check, we reconstruct the commodity export price shocks 
using a different criterion to identify shock episodes. Instead of using eq. (1) to 
remove the predictable component of shocks, we now simply define shock episodes as 
the observations for which the first difference of the log annual commodity export 
price index either lies above the 90th percentile of its distribution (positive shocks) or 
below the 10th percentile (negative shocks). The results, reported in Table 5, column 
(5), show that our findings are robust. 
 
We next investigate whether the effects vary across different types of shocks. We 
distinguish between non-agricultural price shocks and agricultural price shocks, and 
construct measures for each of these, using the methodology described in section 2.1. 
We also construct interactions of both of these measures with the speed of firm exit 
  
indicator. We replace the shock and its interaction with speed of firm exit in Table 5, 
column (1), by the two separate shock measures and their interactions with speed of 
firm exit and rerun the specification. The results are reported in Table 5, column (6). 
The non-agricultural price shock enters with a negative sign and its coefficient is 
significant at 1%. The interaction of non-agricultural price shocks with the speed of 
firm exit has a positive sign and is significant at 1%. Hence, the results for non-
agricultural shocks are entirely consistent with the results we found for the general 
commodity export price shocks. By contrast, the agricultural price shock and its 
interaction with speed of firm exit have the opposite signs, while their coefficients are 
far from significant. This indicates that our findings were driven by the non-
agricultural export price shocks. 
 
Two distinctions between the revenues from the extractive sector and those from the 
agricultural sector might account for this difference. One is that in the former, sizeable 
revenues accrue to the government whereas in the latter revenues accrue 
predominantly to farmer households. The difference in the consequences of shocks for 
growth may therefore be because farm households are more adept at cushioning 
spending in response to shocks than are governments. In this case the rest of the 
economy has less need to adjust so that the speed of firm exit might not show up as 
important.  A second evident difference is that the rural economy is largely informal. 
As a result, the regulatory regime would not matter because it is not enforced in the 
rural economy. A further implication of rural informality might be that shocks within 
it are well-absorbed by price and employment flexibility, mitigating the effects on the 
formal economy. In contrast, extractive shocks accrue to the formal economy, directly 
hitting the government and extractive companies, and having knock-on effects for 
  
their suppliers. Evidently, it is the formal economy which would be most affected by 
regulations on firm exit.   
 
As four final robustness checks, we experiment with alternative sets of controls. We 
first transform the model in Table 5, column (1), into an autoregressive distributed lag 
model by removing the long-run GDP determinants and the lagged level of GDP per 
capita. The results from estimating this model are reported in Table 5, column (7). 
Our results are robust. We then strip the specification in Table 5, column (1), three 
more times. First, we remove all insignificant controls (results in Table 5, column 8). 
Secondly, we drop the trade openness variables (results in Table 5, column 9). And 
finally, we drop the lagged dependent variable (results in Table 5, column 10). In all 
cases, the results are robust.29 
 
4.2 Natural disasters 
 
                                                 
29
 We also tested the robustness of our findings to employing cross-sectional OLS estimation. We find 
no significant effect of commodity export price volatility (the country-specific standard deviation of the 
price index) on average GDP growth. However, we do find that the volatility of prices significantly 
increases the volatility of growth. We also find that this effect is significantly smaller in countries with 
higher speeds of firm exit. These results are consistent with our panel data findings, which show that 
negative export price shocks lead to lower short run growth but that shocks do not have an effect on 
long run GDP, and that the short run effect of shocks is smaller in countries with more flexible 
bankruptcy procedures. An additional finding from the cross-sectional analysis is that both the speed of 
firm exit and the flexibility of employment have a positive direct effect on average growth, although 
not significant. 
  
We next consider the robustness of our finding that labour market flexibility cushions 
the adverse effect of natural disasters. As a first check, we re-estimate the 
specification of Table 4 without the interaction of the natural disaster indicator with 
the indicator of speed of firm exit. The results are reported in Table 6, column (1). 
The coefficients of the natural disaster variable and its interaction with employment 
flexibility are now both significant at 1%, although smaller in size. 
 
To allow for the possibility that the effects vary across different types of natural 
disasters, we replace the total number of disasters and its interaction with employment 
flexibility in Table 6, column (1), by three separate variables that capture the number 
of geological, climatic, and humanitarian disasters and interactions of each of these 
with employment flexibility. The results are reported in Table 6, column (2). The 
indicator of geological shocks enters with a negative sign and is significant at 10%, 
while its interaction with the flexibility of employment has a positive but insignificant 
coefficient. The size of both coefficients is larger than the size of the coefficients in 
column (1), suggesting that the results for geological shocks, although less significant, 
are consistent with the general effects found in column (1) or even slightly stronger. 
The coefficients for climatic shocks are almost identical to the ones in column (1), 
both in terms of size and significance, suggesting that our findings for natural 
disasters are predominantly driven by climatic shocks. By contrast, the indicator of 
humanitarian disasters and its interaction with employment flexibility enter with signs 
opposite to the signs of the coefficients in column (1), while their coefficients are not 
significant.  
 
  
Again, the results should be interpreted with caution, as the coefficients may suffer 
from endogeneity. As before, endogeneity could relate to the shocks, the policies, or 
both. Natural disasters may for example occur more often in countries with particular 
geographical characteristics that could also affect growth. However, since our 
estimation model includes fixed effects, we effectively control for all time invariant 
growth determinants, including geography. Hence, our indicator of natural disasters is 
not likely to suffer from endogeneity.  
 
To address the possible endogeneity of the policy variables, we first repeat the 
robustness exercises of the previous subsection and separately add the other Doing 
Business indicators, institutional indicators, and exchange rate flexibility and aid to 
the specification of Table 6, column (1). We do not find evidence that our results are 
explained by a correlation between flexibility of employment and any of these 
variables (results for exchange rate flexibility and aid reported in Table 6, column 
3).30  
                                                 
30
 In the specifications for the 35 other Doing Business indicators, the natural disaster variable enters 
negative and significant at 1% in 6 specifications, negative and significant at 5% in 10 specifications, 
negative and significant at 10% in 6 specifications, and insignificant in 13 specifications. The 
coefficient of the interaction of the natural disaster variable with the flexibility of employment indicator 
is always positive and the significance level of the coefficient is robust: 1% in 29 specifications and 5% 
in 6 specifications. The coefficients of the interactions between the natural disaster variable and the 
other Doing Business indicators are insignificant in 31 specifications, while significant at 10% in 2 
specifications and significant at 5% in 2 specifications. In the specifications for the 12 indicators of 
institutional quality, the natural disaster variable always enters with a negative sign, while the 
significance level of the coefficient is robust: 1% in 7 specifications and 5% in 5 specifications. The 
coefficient of the interaction of the natural disaster variable with the flexibility of employment indicator 
  
 
We also test the robustness of our results by replacing the indicator of the number of 
natural disasters by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a country has one or 
more disasters in a given year, and zero otherwise. The results, reported in Table 6, 
column (4), show that our results are robust. 
  
So far we have used the labour market flexibility indicator from the World Bank’s 
Doing Business database. To further investigate whether flexibility indeed matters, we 
also tested the robustness of our findings to using an indicator from a different source. 
In particular, we collected data on the flexibility of wage determination, and hiring 
and firing practices from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2008/2009 (World Economic Forum, 2008). The 
GCR data are based on a worldwide executive survey and provide measures of de 
facto labour market flexibility, whereas the Doing Business indicators capture de jure 
labour market flexibility.  
 
Using the GCR variables 7.02 (‘Flexibility of Wage Determination’) and 7.05 
(‘Hiring and Firing Practices’), we construct a composite measure of flexibility of 
employment in the following way. We first normalize the two variables so that they 
range from 0 to 1 and rescale them so that a higher value corresponds to a more 
flexible labour market (so as to ease comparison to the original results). We then use 
                                                                                                                                            
is always positive, while the coefficient is always significant at 1%. The coefficients of the interactions 
between the natural disaster variable and the institutional indicators are never significant. 
  
the average of the two normalized and rescaled variables in our estimations.31 The 
correlation between this measure of employment flexibility and the employment 
flexibility indicator based on Doing Business is 0.41. This relatively low correlation is 
consistent with the findings in Chor and Freeman (2004) for an alternative de facto 
indicator of flexibility. They suggest that the low correlation presumably reflects the 
divergence between regulations and implementation.  
 
Using the alternative indicator of employment flexibility based on the GCR, we re-
estimate all specifications that included the natural disaster variable and the labour 
market flexibility measure based on Doing Business. Our findings are strongly robust 
to using the indicator based on the GCR. The natural disaster variable always enters 
with a negative sign and is always significant at 1%. The interaction of the shock with 
employment flexibility always enters with a positive sign and is significant at 5% in 
six specifications, while significant at 1% in two specifications. The size of the 
coefficients for both the natural disaster variable and its interaction with flexibility is 
considerably larger than before, suggesting that our original estimates may represent a 
lower bound on the true effects. For the specification of Table 6, column (1), the 
results of this exercise are reported in Table 6, column (5).32  
                                                 
31
 Doing Business constructs its composite measure of rigidity of employment in a similar way. While 
the Doing Business indicators have an ordinal scale, the GCR data have a cardinal scale and so we do 
not introduce them as dummies.  
32
 The coefficient of the interaction term is bigger than the coefficient of the shock by itself. However, 
given that the flexibility of employment indicator ranges from 0.37 to 0.81 for the countries in this 
estimation sample, the net growth effect of natural disasters ranges from -1.2 % points (significant at 
1%) for a country with the least flexible labour market to 0.2 % points (insignificant, p-value = 0.45) 
  
 
We also investigated the sensitivity of our results to using the continuous employment 
flexibility indicator (based on Doing Business) instead of the dummies we have used 
so far. We again re-estimate all specifications that included natural disasters and 
labour market flexibility but we now replaced the flexibility dummy by its 
corresponding continuous variable. Our results are robust in terms of significance and 
the size of the coefficients again increases.33 For the specification of Table 6, column 
(1), the results of this exercise are reported in Table 6, column (6).   
 
Finally, in Table 6, columns (7) to (10), we again experiment with alternative sets of 
controls. In column (7) we remove the long-run GDP determinants and the lagged 
level of GDP per capita, while in columns (8) to (10) we remove all insignificant 
controls, trade openness, and the lagged dependent variable, respectively. The results 
are robust.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
At a time when the volatility and unpredictability of commodity prices has been 
dramatically demonstrated, it is appropriate to consider the consequences of large and 
unanticipated price declines.  We have focused on structural policies that are well-
suited to mitigating such adverse shocks. The advantage of structural policies is that 
                                                                                                                                            
for countries with the most flexible labour market. The latter effect is far from significant and close to 
zero.  
33
 The natural disaster variable always enters with a negative sign and is significant at 1% in all eight 
specifications. The interaction of the shock with employment flexibility always enters with a positive 
sign and is significant at 1% in six specifications and at 5% in two specifications. 
  
they do not depend upon a government responding in a timely and appropriate manner 
to a price deterioration. Actual responses may fall far short of the ideal both because 
policy change is a slow process, and because determining at the onset of a price shock 
its likely scale and duration may be infeasible. In contrast, structural policies can be 
put in place at any time prior to an adverse shock and then simply left alone. 
 
We have investigated the efficacy of a range of structural policies. Some policies, 
notably financial depth and openness, despite having received much emphasis in the 
policy literature, appear not to have significant net effects. In contrast, we find that 
some regulatory policies which have been neglected appear to have large effects 
which differ according to the type of shock. We have distinguished between adverse 
price shocks to mineral exporters and those to agricultural exporters, compared these 
adverse price shocks to positive price shocks, and finally compared price shocks to 
natural disasters.  
 
We find that regulations that delay the speed of firm closure, significantly and 
substantially increase the short-term growth loss from adverse price shocks in 
mineral-exporting countries and that if those delays are severe the growth loss from 
such shocks is typically very substantial. We have suggested that delays in firm exit 
may amplify the short-term growth loss from a shock by impeding credit and locking 
up scarce entrepreneurship. In contrast, adverse agricultural price shocks do not 
generate significant losses and regulations that delay firm exit are of no consequence 
for shock mitigation. We have suggested that this may be because rural households 
are better at smoothing their consumption than is government, and that the informality 
of the rural economy facilitates adjustment and makes regulations irrelevant. Positive 
  
price shocks do not typically generate significant short term increases in real output. 
Here the explanation for the asymmetry with negative shocks is likely to be that the 
economy is normally operating near its short term production potential. Natural 
disasters typically have only relatively small adverse effects on aggregate output. 
However, the policies that appear able to mitigate these costs are distinctive. The 
speed of firm exit is not significant, but labour market flexibility substantially reduces 
the short-term output losses. We have suggested that these distinctive aspects of 
natural disasters may be because as predominantly rural phenomena they dislocate 
people more than firms.   
 
We have subjected these results to a range of robustness tests. While our underlying 
measures of regulatory policies are too recent to be time-variant, by introducing an 
extensive range of controls for other regulations, for other policies, and for 
institutional quality, we have addressed reasonable concerns regarding endogeneity. 
Similarly, we have shown that the consequences of commodity price shocks are 
robust to concerns that they might be endogenous to supply shocks in exporting 
countries.   
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Table 1a: Summary statistics 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Real GDP per capita (log) 3564 7.54 1.55 4.31 10.55 
Trade to GDP 3564 0.65 0.36 0.06 2.51 
Inflation (log [1 + inflation rate])  3564 0.14 0.29 -0.24 5.48 
Reserves to GDP 3564 0.09 0.10 0.00 1.24 
Annual commodity export price index (1980 = 100) 3564 81.06 26.80 15.10 230.05 
Weighted log annual commodity export price index 3564 0.34 0.36 0.00 1.97 
Commodity exports to GDP 3564 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.45 
Commodity export price volatility 3564 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 
Oil import price index 3564 3.12 1.85 0.00 4.96 
∆ GDP per capita (log)
 
3564 0.02 0.05 -0.36 0.30 
∆ Trade to GDP 3564 0.01 0.08 -0.88 1.21 
∆ Inflation (log [1 + inflation rate]) 3564 -0.00 0.19 -3.62 2.52 
∆ Reserves to GDP 3564 0.00 0.03 -0.25 0.31 
Coup
 
 3564 0.03 0.17 0 2 
Civil war 3564 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Flexible exchange rate 2865 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Aid (log)
 
2760 1.44 1.01 -0.92 4.38 
Flexibility of employment 124 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Speed of firm exit 110 0.73 0.17 0 1 
Speed of firm entry 122 0.50 0.13 0.19 1 
 Number Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Positive commodity export price shocks (unweighted) 372 0.28 0.18 -0.03 1.03 
Negative commodity export price shocks (unweighted) 392 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.81 
Natural disasters 683 1.32 0.59 1 4 
Notes: Our indicators of flexibility of employment and speed of firm exit and entry are based on cross-
sections of average 2004-2007 values for 124, 110, and 122 countries, respectively. We use these 
average values for all the years in our sample. 
 
Table 1b: Commodities 
Non-agricultural  Agricultural 
aluminum oil  bananas fish palmkerneloil sisal tobacco 
phosphatrock coal  barley maize palmoil sorghum wheat 
copper silver  butter pepper oliveoil soybeanoil wool 
gasoline tin  cocoabeans hides plywood soybeans  
ironore lead  coconutoil jute poultry sugar  
uranium urea  coffee groundnutoil pulp sunfloweroil  
natural gas zinc  copra groundnuts rice swinemeat  
nickel   cotton oranges rubber tea  
 
 
  
Table 2: Estimation results cointegration model 
Long-run coefficients  Short-run coefficients (cont’d) 
Trade to GDP 0.475***  ∆ Reserves to GDPt-1 0.050 
 (0.135)   (0.035) 
Inflation (log) -0.186**  ∆ (GDP per capita (log))t-1 0.143*** 
 (0.077)   (0.029) 
Reserves to GDP 0.696***  Coupt -0.031*** 
 (0.252)   (0.007) 
Commodity export price index -1.009***  Civil wart -0.022*** 
 (0.339)   (0.005) 
Oil import price index -0.106  Positive price shockt 0.044 
 (0.082)   (0.084) 
Commodity exp. price volatility 2.237  Positive price shockt-1 0.091* 
 (4.419)   (0.052) 
Short-run adjustment coefficient  Negative price shockt -0.060 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 -0.062***   (0.062) 
 (0.008)  Negative price shockt-1 -0.340*** 
Short-run coefficients   (0.102) 
∆ Trade to GDPt-1 0.017  Natural disastert -0.036** 
 
(0.015)   (0.015) 
∆ Inflation (log)t-1 -0.003    
 (0.004)    
Number of observations 3564  R-squared within 0.26 
Number of countries 129    
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions 
include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The long-run coefficients correspond to 1•)/1(- βλ  and 2•)/1(- βλ  in eq. (2). 
 
 
  
Table 3: The effect of negative commodity export price shocks 
Long-run coefficients  Short-run coefficients (cont’d) 
Trade to GDP 0.590***  Positive price shockt 0.425 
 (0.152)   (0.426) 
Inflation (log) -0.219***  Positive price shockt * flex. of employment 0.127 
 (0.075)   (0.125) 
Reserves to GDP 0.978***  Positive price shockt * speed of firm exit -0.521 
 (0.253)   (0.575) 
Commodity export price index -0.773*  Positive price shockt-1 0.131 
 (0.415)   (0.336) 
Oil import price index -0.076  Positive price shockt-1* flex. of employment -0.082 
 (0.086)   (0.177) 
Commodity exp. price volatility -1.722  Positive price shockt-1* speed of firm exit -0.052 
 (4.465)   (0.539) 
Short-run adjustment coefficient  Negative price shockt -0.096 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 -0.061***   (0.274) 
 (0.009)  Negative price shockt* flex. of employment -0.154 
Short-run coefficients   (0.127) 
∆ Trade to GDPt-1 0.015  Negative price shockt* speed of firm exit 0.167 
 
(0.018)   (0.439) 
∆ Inflation (log)t-1 -0.002  Negative price shockt-1 -1.003*** 
 (0.004)   (0.369) 
∆ Reserves to GDPt-1 0.064*  Negative price shockt-1* flex. of employment 0.107 
 (0.036)   (0.115) 
∆ (GDP per capita (log))t-1 0.152***  Negative price shockt-1* speed of firm exit 0.941** 
 (0.031)   (0.438) 
Coupt -0.032***    
 (0.007)    
Civil wart -0.017***    
 (0.005)    
Natural disastert -0.038**    
 (0.017)    
Number of observations 3156  R-squared within 0.30 
Number of countries 110    
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions 
include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
The long-run coefficients correspond to 1•)/1(- βλ  and 2•)/1(- βλ  in eq. (2). 
  
Table 4: The effect of natural disasters 
Long-run coefficients  Short-run coefficients (cont’d) 
Trade to GDP 0.578***  ∆ (GDP per capita (log))t-1 0.149*** 
 (0.147)   (0.029) 
Inflation (log) -0.212***  Coupt -0.033*** 
 (0.075)   (0.007) 
Reserves to GDP 1.052***  Civil wart -0.017*** 
 (0.253)   (0.005) 
Commodity export price index -0.798*  Positive price shockt 0.114 
 (0.410)   (0.082) 
Oil import price index -0.082  Positive price shockt-1 0.070 
 (0.085)   (0.066) 
Commodity exp. price volatility -1.626  Negative price shockt -0.042 
 (4.230)   (0.062) 
Short-run adjustment coefficient  Negative price shockt-1 -0.306*** 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 -0.062***   (0.113) 
 (0.009)  Natural disastert -0.129** 
Short-run coefficients   (0.064) 
∆ Trade to GDPt-1 0.018  Natural disastert* flex. of employment 0.114*** 
 
(0.018)   (0.028) 
∆ Inflation (log)t-1 -0.002  Natural disastert* speed of firm exit 0.048 
 (0.005)   (0.079) 
∆ Reserves to GDPt-1 0.059    
 (0.037)    
Number of observations 3156  R-squared within 0.30 
Number of countries 110    
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions 
include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
The long-run coefficients correspond to 1•)/1(- βλ  and 2•)/1(- βλ  in eq. (2). 
 
 Table 5: The effect of negative commodity export price shocks – robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Shock -1.09** -1.10*** -1.93*** -1.15*** -1.11***  -1.16*** -1.16*** -1.12*** -1.09** 
 (0.42) (0.36) (0.44) (0.41) (0.40)  (0.42) (0.40) (0.42) (0.42) 
Shock
 * speed of firm exit 1.13** 1.48*** 2.03*** 1.24** 1.16**  1.19** 1.27** 1.15** 1.13** 
 (0.51) (0.56) (0.65) (0.51) (0.50)  (0.52) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) 
Shock
 * speed of firm entry  -0.52         
  (0.58)         
Shock * flex. exchange rate   0.16        
   (0.21)        
Shock
 * aid   0.10        
   (0.11)        
Shock non-agri      -1.15***     
      (0.38)     
Shock non-agri * speed of firm exit      1.24***     
      (0.47)     
Shock agri      0.53     
      (1.11)     
Shock agri * speed of firm exit      -0.68     
      (1.41)     
Method FE FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE-ARDL FE FE FE 
Number of observations 3156 3115 1211 3156 3201 3156 3156 3210 3412 3160 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Only the coefficients and standard 
errors of the variables of interest are reported. The variable ‘shock’ corresponds to the lagged negative price shock, ‘shock non-agri’ denotes the lagged negative non-agricultural 
price shock and ‘shock agri’ represents the lagged negative agricultural price shock. The specifications of columns (1) to (6) include all controls of Table 3, except for the 
interactions of the shocks with employment flexibility. In column (7), the long run controls are dropped. In column (8), the insignificant controls from Table 2 and their interactions 
are dropped. In column (9), the trade openness variables are dropped. In column (10), the lagged dependent variable is dropped.       
  
Table 6: The effect of natural disasters – robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Shock -0.07***  -0.15** -0.09*** -0.24*** -0.14*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02)  (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Shock
 * flex. of employment 0.08***  0.10** 0.11**  0.21*** 0.08*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.09*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Shock geo  -0.12*         
Shock geo
 * flex. of employment  0.12         
Shock clim  -0.07***         
Shock clim
 * flex. of employment  0.10***         
Shock hum  0.05         
Shock hum
 * flex. of employment  -0.29         
Shock
 * flex. exchange rate   -0.00        
   (0.04)        
Shock
 * aid   0.03        
   (0.02)        
Shock
 * flex. of employment (WEF)     0.33**      
     (0.13)      
Method FE FE FE-IV FE FE FE FE-ARDL FE FE FE 
Number of observations 3469 3469 1283 3469 2904 3469 3469 3521 3782 3473 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses, except for the geological, climatic, and humanitarian shocks (to save space). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Only the coefficients and standard errors of the variables of interest are reported. The variable ‘shock’ corresponds to the natural disasters 
indicator. ‘Shock geo’, ‘Shock clim’, and ‘Shock hum’ capture geological, climatic, and humanitarian disasters. ‘flex. of employment (WEF)’ denotes the indicator of employment 
flexibility based on data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. The specifications of columns (1) to (6) include all controls of Table 4, except for the 
interactions of the shock with the speed of firm exit. In column (7), the long run controls are dropped. In column (8), the insignificant controls from Table 2 and their interactions 
are dropped. In column (9), the trade openness variables are dropped. In column (10), the lagged dependent variable is dropped.       
 
  
